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Unbundling Criminal Trial Rights 
John Rappaport† 
The notion that criminal defendants are put to an all-or-nothing choice be-
tween the guilty plea and full-blown jury trial is both pervasive and wrong. De-
fendants can, and sometimes do, “unbundle” their jury trial rights and trade them 
piecemeal, consenting to streamlined trial procedures to reduce their sentencing 
exposure. This Essay explores what would happen if, once and for all, we eschewed 
the all-or-nothing framework and actually encouraged these “unbundled bar-
gains.” The parties could then tailor court procedures by agreement. Defendants, 
for example, could bargain for sentencing leniency by consenting to a six-person 
jury. Or the parties might agree to submit a case to private arbitration. Would 
such a world be better or worse than the one we have now? This Essay takes a first 
cut at this question, making the uneasy case that the benefits of unbundled bar-
gaining may plausibly outweigh the costs. 
INTRODUCTION 
There are two paths an accused can go down to resolve crim-
inal charges against him. He can elect a trial, invoking a bundle 
of procedural protections the law provides for his defense. Or, 
like the vast majority of defendants, he can plea-bargain, declin-
ing to contest guilt and trading this bundle of rights for leniency 
at sentencing. This single choice has generated a rich, varied, 
and exhaustive academic literature.  
The choice, however, is largely illusory. Criminal defendants 
can, and sometimes do, “unbundle” their jury trial rights and 
trade them piecemeal, consenting to streamlined trial proce-
dures to reduce their sentencing exposure. The mechanisms 
through which they do this—including jury waivers and  
 
 † Lecturer in Law and Bigelow Teaching Fellow, The University of Chicago Law 
School. I am grateful to Omri Ben-Shahar, Rich Chen, Adam Chilton, Charlie Gerstein, 
Genevieve Lakier, Saul Levmore, Richard McAdams, Tom Miles, David Sklansky, and 
Lior Strahilevitz, whose incisive comments probed deeper than I was able to venture in 
this exploratory analysis. Errors and omissions are mine, not theirs. For helpful discus-
sions and suggestions, thanks as well to Zach Clopton, Dan Epps, Adi Leibovitch, Crys-
tal Yang, the Chicago Bigelow Fellows, and participants at the conference Criminal Pro-
cedure in the Spotlight: Theoretical, Constitutional, and Administrative Developments, 
The University of Chicago Law School (May 30, 2014), and the Chicago Junior Faculty 
Workshop, The University of Chicago Law School (Aug 19, 2014). 
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conditional guilty pleas—are familiar. But no substantial litera-
ture addresses the distinctive set of common issues they raise. 
Hazy legal-cultural norms, meanwhile, backed by scattered legal 
precedent, cabin these pockets of “unbundled bargaining,” help-
ing sustain the myth of binary choice. 
Here I explore what might follow were we to dispel the illu-
sion that plea bargaining occurs within an all-or-nothing 
framework. The guilty plea and jury trial would no longer be  
binary options but rather end points on a spectrum of adjudica-
tive procedures ordered by complexity. As complexity increased, 
so would the defendant’s likely sentence if convicted, and vice 
versa. Immediately, a new universe of potential bargaining op-
tions opens up. Can the defendant, for example, bargain for sen-
tencing leniency by consenting to be tried by a six-person jury? 
Can he barter away his Confrontation Clause rights? To what 
extent can the parties fine-tune court procedures by agreement? 
Need they go to court at all, or can they agree to submit a case to 
private arbitration? How should we think about bargains like 
this? Should they be encouraged? Prohibited? If the latter, does 
this make us think differently about society’s tolerance for plea 
bargaining? 
And perhaps most important: Is a world of unbundled bar-
gaining better or worse than the plea bargaining system as 
presently understood and practiced? I cannot purport to answer 
this last question definitively here, as both space and the topic’s 
complexity constrain me. I will instead suggest how to think 
through the preliminary issues and, in doing so, make the un-
easy case that the benefits of unbundled bargaining may plausi-
bly outweigh the costs. The calculus is somewhat complex—
involving both private and social effects—but one potential  
consequence of unbundled bargaining deserves special note: By 
permitting the parties to streamline trials, we may make trials 
more common. By expanding the range of procedural issues over 
which the parties bargain, that is, we may reduce the frequency 
with which they bargain over guilt and innocence. This would 
have several salutary effects that I discuss below. And if my ten-
tative normative position is wrong—and expanding unbundled 
bargaining would make society worse off—I will not have wasted 
the reader’s time. Instead I will have rendered ripe for reconsid-
eration the unbundled bargains our system presently condones.  
Because I treat plea bargaining as the baseline case, I need 
not, and do not, engage the extensive debate about plea  
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bargaining’s legitimacy or desirability.1 Nor do I entertain the 
abolitionist alternative. This is a pragmatic choice, not a norma-
tive one, and should not be understood to endorse plea bargain-
ing or dismiss the many powerful critiques that have been lev-
eled against it. Rather, my framing capitulates to the reality 
that “[t]he time for a crusade to prohibit plea bargaining has 
passed,” and scholarly efforts are better spent exploring ways to 
make the criminal-justice system we have “less awful.”2 
A few scholars have, in recent work and varying terminolo-
gy, acknowledged the possibility of unbundled bargains like the 
ones that I discuss. I build on their contributions, aiming to ex-
pose the extent to which present practice already embraces un-
bundled bargaining and pursue the underlying theory to its 
ends, including private arbitration.3 I do so, however, in a man-
ner designed to stimulate rather than end the discussion. There 
will remain much more to say on the topic after I am done. 
 
 1 Compare, for example, Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defend-
ant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U Chi L Rev 931, 
1024–43 (1983), with Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 
J Legal Stud 289, 308–22 (1983).  
 2 Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering 
Wound, 51 Duquesne L Rev 673, 706–07 (2013) (conceding, after decades of abolitionist 
advocacy, that plea bargaining is here to stay). See also Gerard E. Lynch, Our Adminis-
trative System of Criminal Justice, 66 Fordham L Rev 2117, 2141 (1998) (contrasting 
plea bargaining with a “formal model” of criminal justice “that has long been discarded 
in practice, and has little hope of ever being revived”). 
 3 See, for example, Talia Fisher, The Boundaries of Plea Bargaining: Negotiating 
the Standard of Proof, 97 J Crim L & Crimin 943, 944–45 & n 6 (2007) (proposing a ne-
gotiable standard of proof and flagging, but not developing, the possibility of additional 
unbundled bargains); Gregory M. Gilchrist, Counsel’s Role in Bargaining for Trials, 99 
Iowa L Rev 1979, 1982, 1988–92 (2014) (identifying fact stipulations and bench trials as 
precedents for unbundled bargains and suggesting three bargains defendants might pro-
pose); Gregory M. Gilchrist, Trial Bargaining *1–24, 60–67 (University of Toledo College 
of Law Working Paper, Oct 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Q7SX-HUCA (similar); 
Samuel R. Gross, Pretrial Incentives, Post-conviction Review, and Sorting Criminal Pros-
ecutions by Guilt or Innocence, 56 NY L Sch L Rev 1009, 1011 (2012) (proposing a mech-
anism by which defendants “waive major procedural rights at trial, in return for im-
portant procedural advantages on post-conviction review”). See also Nancy Jean King, 
Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal Litigation, 47 UCLA L Rev 113, 
118–19, 124 (1999) (identifying the bargaining aspect of some stipulations and waivers 
and suggesting that “the market for some rights may yet emerge”); Saul Levmore and 
Ariel Porat, Bargaining with Double Jeopardy, 40 J Legal Stud 273, 282–92 (2011) (sug-
gesting the potential utility of permitting defendants to waive double jeopardy protection 
against retrial after acquittal). 
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I.  ANTECEDENTS 
The plea bargaining literature tells us that criminal charges 
put defendants to an “all-or-nothing,” “binary” choice between 
the guilty plea and full-blown jury trial.4 Just beneath the sur-
face, however, it is not difficult to identify practices in which 
prosecutors and defendants bargain incrementally. They do this 
in two ways. 
The parties sometimes bargain over the procedures for ad-
judication. “Short of foregoing trial altogether,” that is, “defend-
ants can make trials more economical or less risky for prosecu-
tors by agreeing to a variety of stipulations or by waiving 
particular rules, including statutes that mandate certain fact-
finders, that require unanimous verdicts, or that require the de-
fendant to be present.”5 Some defendants even agree to whittle 
down trial proceedings to a single issue. In a conditional guilty 
plea, for example, the prosecutor exchanges leniency for the de-
fendant’s agreement to concede guilt if a particular procedural 
defense, such as a Fourth Amendment suppression motion, 
fails.6 A stipulated trial works similarly. The defendant pleads 
not guilty and, if he loses a pretrial motion, waives his right to a 
jury trial and stipulates to the prosecution’s case. This preserves 
the legal issue for appeal.7 
Other bargains focus not on the procedures for adjudication, 
but the identity of the adjudicator. Juries slow down trials; de-
fendants can thus extract concessions in exchange for their  
 
 4 See, for example, Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor 
Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 Va L Rev 271, 313 (2013) (calling plea bargaining 
an “all-or-nothing proposition”); Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U Pa L Rev 
1117, 1130 (2008) (explaining that defendants “can expect only a binary choice: plea or 
trial”) (emphasis omitted); Gross, 56 NY L Sch L Rev at 1011 (cited in note 3) (“The pre-
trial choice that American criminal defendants face today is stark: plead guilty and ac-
cept the conviction and punishment the prosecutor offers, or go to trial and risk much 
worse.”); Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law 
Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 
Cal L Rev 539, 639 (1990) (describing the defendant’s “all-or-nothing choice”); Milton 
Heumann, Plea Bargaining: The Experiences of Prosecutors, Judges, and Defense  
Attorneys 167 (Chicago 1978) (describing the defendant’s options in court as “either trial 
or plea bargain”). 
 5 King, 47 UCLA L Rev at 118 (cited in note 3). See also Frase, 78 Cal L Rev at 
643 (cited in note 4) (“Prosecutors and defense counsel [ ] engage in . . . ‘stipulation bar-
gaining’ over issues such as chain of custody and authentication of records.”). 
 6 See FRCrP 11(a)(2).  
 7 See Nancy J. King, et al, When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sen-
tences after Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105  
Colum L Rev 959, 970–71 & n 43, 979 & n 76 (2005). 
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consent to litigate before a more efficient arbiter. The best-
known example is Philadelphia’s bench trial system, in which 
defendants regularly agreed to waive their jury rights and pro-
ceed to trial before a judge.8 Bench trials were quicker, and the 
chances of acquittal were thought to be lower, both of which ap-
pealed to prosecutors.9 But sentencing exposure was also re-
duced, drawing in defendants.10 Likewise, federal misdemeanor 
defendants might be able to “purchase” leniency by consenting 
to trial before a magistrate judge.11 And if we take seriously 
Judge Gerard Lynch’s claim that ours is an “administrative sys-
tem of criminal justice,”12 plea bargaining itself incorporates an 
agreement about the identity of the adjudicator, at least in some 
cases. Lynch describes a practice—federal white-collar cases are 
the archetype—in which the defense makes an extensive presen-
tation and argument to the prosecutor, who then essentially “ad-
judicates” the case and “sentences” the defendant.13 In other 
words, the parties agree to have the prosecutor, rather than a 
jury or judge, determine the defendant’s guilt as well as the ap-
propriate punishment. 
II.  POSSIBILITIES 
This brief discussion shows that, notwithstanding the all-or-
nothing framework that orders much scholarly thinking about 
plea bargaining, defendants sometimes unbundle their trial 
rights and trade them piecemeal for reduced sentencing expo-
sure. Still, we seem to think, or perhaps assume, that many oth-
er rights are inalienable. Precedent forbids certain bargains. 
Most federal courts, for example, prohibit defendants from waiv-
ing jury unanimity.14 And other deals—such as an agreement to 
change the burden of proof—would simply strike us as odd (and 
possibly inappropriate) and have not, to my knowledge, been  
 
 8 See Alschuler, 50 U Chi L Rev at 1024–43 (cited in note 1). 
 9 See id at 1037–38; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 
Harv L Rev 1037, 1062–63 (1984).  
 10 See Schulhofer, 97 Harv L Rev at 1062–63 (cited in note 9). 
 11 See 28 USC § 636(a). See also Peretz v United States, 501 US 923, 934 (1991) 
(reading the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 USC §§ 631–39, to permit courts to experiment 
with the use of magistrates “to improve the efficient administration of the courts’  
dockets”).  
 12 Lynch, 66 Fordham L Rev at 2117 (cited in note 2). 
 13 See id at 2125–27.  
 14 See, for example, United States v Pachay, 711 F2d 488, 493 (2d Cir 1983). 
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attempted.15 This should give us pause for the simple reason 
that, at least in theory, rights that cannot be “sold” individually 
are worth less than rights that can.16 This means that restricting 
unbundled trade risks depriving defendants of the full value of 
their entitlements. There may, after careful consideration, be 
good reasons for such strictures nonetheless. But we should not 
draw this conclusion reflexively. 
In Section A, I consider why, in general, the parties might 
wish to enter into unbundled bargains. This discussion both ex-
plains existing practices and suggests that litigants would likely 
seize on expanded opportunities to bargain. In Section B, I sug-
gest some of the specific trades that the parties might wish to 
make. Throughout my analysis, I make two assumptions to sim-
plify exposition. First, I assume that the defendant’s counsel is 
publicly funded. The bargaining dynamics may differ when 
counsel is privately paid, and I focus on the more common case. 
Second, I assume that the prosecution compensates the defend-
ant’s waiver of rights with charging or sentencing leniency. In 
practice, other forms of remuneration—such as a waiver of the 
prosecution’s own procedural entitlements—may also be availa-
ble, but it is simpler for now to exclude them.17 
A. Why Unbundled Bargaining? 
There is reason to think that litigants in some cases would 
find an unbundled bargain more attractive than either a guilty 
plea or a full-blown jury trial. To see why, consider what makes 
the parties in a criminal case bargain over the defendant’s 
rights at all. Each of the defendant’s procedural entitlements 
has a tendency to increase the costs of trial, the odds of acquit-
tal, or both. These are the things a prosecutor will “pay” to re-
duce. When the parties make a deal to streamline or eliminate 
 
 15 See, for example, Fisher, 97 J Crim L & Crimin at 947–48 (cited in note 3) (call-
ing the burden of proof “a nonnegotiable, fixed, and indivisible feature of the criminal 
process,” though advocating a contrary arrangement); King, 47 UCLA L Rev at 124  
(cited in note 3) (“Another procedural feature that has yet to be traded openly is the 
standard of proof.”). 
 16 Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 Yale L J 1969, 1975 
(1992). See also Robert E. Scott and William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 
Yale L J 1909, 1913 (1992). 
 17 See, for example, Gross, 56 NY L Sch L Rev at 1023–24 (cited in note 3). 
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trial, therefore, they engage in some combination of “costs bar-
gaining” and “odds bargaining.”18 
Note that these are porous categories that do not map neat-
ly onto distinct sets of rights—one cannot say that a particular 
right impacts only costs or only odds. It depends on the circum-
stances. Confrontation Clause rights, for example, might raise 
the odds of acquittal if the defendant has a promising line of 
cross-examination, but may in another case merely threaten to 
prolong the trial. Indeed, the parties in a single case may not 
agree whether a right affects the likelihood of acquittal—the de-
fendant might think it does not, and so see the “sale” of that 
right as a costs bargain only, whereas the prosecutor might 
think she is bargaining over both costs and odds. If it seems 
strange that the defendant would bargain away rights that raise 
his chances of acquittal, the key is the sentencing leniency he 
gets in return. Of course, he does not receive as much leniency 
as if he had pleaded guilty, but he retains the ability to contest 
guilt under a set of procedures that he finds at least minimally 
satisfactory, and which he had a hand in shaping. 
Why, though, would the prosecutor not always want to re-
duce the costs of trial and odds of acquittal maximally, by insist-
ing on a plea bargain? The simple answer is that, in some cases, 
obtaining a guilty plea may require the prosecutor to offer a sen-
tence she views as unduly low. We can sharpen the point by ex-
amining the parties’ bargaining dynamics: In each individual 
case, the prosecutor and defendant bargain in a bilateral mo-
nopoly. There is a single seller of punishment leniency (the pros-
ecutor) and a single buyer (the defendant, who pays with rights 
to process).19 Each party has a marginal rate of substitution be-
tween units of leniency and units of process. These measures 
capture how much process the defendant is willing to forgo to 
buy additional leniency, and how much leniency the prosecutor 
 
 18 Albert W. Alschuler, Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The Selective 
Morality of Professor Bibas, 88 Cornell L Rev 1412, 1412 (2003) (quotation marks omit-
ted) (using this terminology in the plea bargaining context).  
 19 Commentators have long characterized the plea bargaining relationship as a  
bilateral monopoly. See, for example, Easterbrook, 12 J Legal Stud at 291, 311 (cited in 
note 1); Eric Rasmusen, Mezzanatto and the Economics of Self-Incrimination, 19 
Cardozo L Rev 1541, 1583 (1998). This framing does, however, obscure some important 
aspects of the bargaining relationship stemming from the prosecutor’s role as a repeat 
player. See, for example, Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, The Prisoners’ (Plea Bar-
gain) Dilemma, 1 J Legal Analysis 737, 738–39, 751 (2009); Jeffrey Standen, Plea  
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 Cal L Rev 1471, 1477–88 (1993). 
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is willing to sell to streamline and reduce the risk of adjudica-
tion, while each maintaining the same level of utility. The 
standard two-person bargaining model states that, if the parties 
make a deal, it will happen when their marginal rates of substi-
tution are equal.20 The point here is that these equilibria may 
occur at interim locations between the guilty plea and full-blown 
jury trial. In fact, it would be rather surprising if the parties’ 
marginal substitution rates always equalized only at those  
endpoints. 
Specific bargaining behavior and outcomes will depend on 
factors such as the defendant’s attitude toward risk as well as 
the prosecution’s marginal trial costs, and the parties’ subjective 
assessments of their prospects in court, under different levels of 
process.21 For example, the parties might strike a deal over the 
defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights if the defendant thinks 
that forgoing those rights will make little difference in his 
chances of acquittal, but the prosecutor thinks the difference 
will be great or that the trial will be substantially cheaper. In 
such a case, the prosecutor will be willing to offer a sentencing 
concession large enough for the parties to reach a deal. But to go 
all the way to pleading guilty, the defendant may demand a 
greater concession than the prosecutor is willing to give. 
One generalization is possible: these interim deals are prob-
ably most likely in serious cases. In petty cases, prosecutors are 
said to try to maximize convictions rather than sentences.22 And 
defendants in petty cases reportedly care more about avoiding 
the process costs of disputing the charges—like missing work—
than preserving their chance at acquittal.23 This makes guilty 
pleas relatively more appealing to both sides, and adjudication 
less so. In serious cases, however, prosecutors aim to maximize 
sentences to a greater degree.24 And defendants, facing long  
 
 20 See James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical 
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy 100–05 (Michigan 1962). See also Fisher, 97 J 
Crim L & Crimin at 953–66 (cited in note 3) (applying the model to negotiation in  
criminal cases).  
 21 See Fisher, 97 J Crim L & Crimin at 956–64 (cited in note 3). 
 22 See Bowers, 156 U Pa L Rev at 1128 (cited in note 4). 
 23 See id at 1132–39. The classic treatment is Malcolm M. Feeley, The Process Is the 
Punishment: Handling Cases in a Lower Criminal Court (Russell Sage 1979). 
 24 See Bowers, 156 U Pa L Rev at 1153–54 (cited in note 4). 
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prison terms, are more likely to be risk seeking.25 Both forces 
push toward adjudication. 
B. What Unbundled Bargaining? 
So what might these additional bargains look like? To start 
by expanding the example mentioned above, the defendant 
might barter his right to confront witnesses, agreeing to curtail 
cross-examination.26 The recent line of Supreme Court decisions 
beginning with Melendez-Diaz v Massachusetts27 enhanced the 
value of this right for many defendants. When the prosecution 
wishes to introduce a forensic report that certifies incriminating 
test results—say, that powder found in the defendant’s car is co-
caine—it must bring to court the laboratory technician who au-
thored the report.28 Prosecutors have complained of the burdens 
this rule inflicts.29 A defendant who does not wish to contest the 
lab results—perhaps his best defense is that he did not know the 
powder was in the car—might offer to release the State from its 
obligation to produce the analyst in exchange for charging or 
sentencing concessions. 
There are many other examples. The defendant might bar-
ter his right to present a defense, for example by consenting to 
limits on the scope of his defense presentation (as measured by 
time or the number of witnesses called).30 He might agree to re-
duce the prosecution’s burden of proof to a preponderance of the 
evidence.31 He might bargain for a modified jury trial with a 
smaller jury32 or a nonunanimous verdict, or agree to forgo  
 
 25 This is true if defendants suffer decreasing marginal disutility from each year of 
imprisonment, a plausible assumption. See Alon Harel and Uzi Segal, Criminal Law and 
Behavioral Law and Economics: Observations on the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in 
Deterring Crime, 1 Am L & Econ Rev 276, 295–98 (1999). 
 26 See Gilchrist, 99 Iowa L Rev at 1988–89 (cited in note 3). 
 27 557 US 305 (2009). 
 28 See id at 311.  
 29 See, for example, Brief of Amici Curiae the National District Attorneys Associa-
tion, and District, Prosecuting, and County Attorneys in Support of Respondent,  
Melendez-Diaz v Massachusetts, No 07-591, *8 (US filed Sept 9, 2008) (available on 
Westlaw at 2008 WL 4185393). 
 30 See Gilchrist, 99 Iowa L Rev at 1988–89 (cited in note 3). 
 31 For an excellent, in-depth treatment of the viability and desirability of bargains 
over the standard of proof, see generally Fisher, 97 J Crim L & Crimin 943 (cited in note 
3). For the civil analogue, see Robert E. Scott and George G. Triantis, Anticipating Liti-
gation in Contract Design, 115 Yale L J 814, 866–78 (2006). 
 32 See Alschuler, 50 U Chi L Rev at 1016–17 (cited in note 1); Gilchrist, 99 Iowa L 
Rev at 1989–91 (cited in note 3). 
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attorney-conducted voir dire.33 Or the parties might simplify the 
rules of evidence by eliminating certain grounds for objection.34 
The parties could even agree to litigate before an arbitrator, 
drastically reducing their draw on judicial resources.35 The flexi-
bility and informality of the arbitral setting would permit the 
parties more readily to streamline the issues for adjudication, 
focusing their efforts on what really matters. For example, a 
case might turn on the credibility of one or two witnesses, which 
the arbitrator could determine after proceedings directed to that 
question alone. Any relaxation of the formal-trial model must be 
compared to the “adjudication” that most defendants (that is, 
those who plead guilty) presently receive. Although an arbitra-
tor is not a judge, neither is she a prosecutor. The defendant 
may prefer adjudication by an impartial—even if nonjudicial—
decisionmaker rather than by the officer charged with pursuing 
the case against him.36 
There would be details to work out in this arbitration model, 
but they probably are not insurmountable. Retired judges might 
make good arbitrators, though any member of the bar (or possi-
bly even nonlawyers) could volunteer. Endowing private citizens 
with essentially adjudicative powers, while uncommon outside 
civil arbitration, is hardly unprecedented in our legal order,37 or 
even our criminal-justice system.38 To make arbitration binding, 
 
 33 See Alschuler, 50 U Chi L Rev at 1017–20 (cited in note 1). 
 34 See Henry W. Taft, Witnesses in Court: With Some Criticisms of Court Procedure 
5–6 (MacMillan 1934): 
In my opinion the pursuit of truth would be promoted if most rules relating to 
oral testimony were abolished, except (1) those relating to materiality, (2) those 
excluding on direct examination questions so leading as to suggest the answer 
the examiner desires, and (3) those excluding testimony where evidence of a 
higher order of competency is available. 
 35 The sole mention that I have seen of the possibility of arbitrating criminal cases 
is a student note. See generally Adina Levine, Note, A Dark State of Criminal Affairs: 
ADR Can Restore Justice to the Criminal “Justice” System, 24 Hamline J Pub L & Pol 
369 (2003). 
 36 See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Les-
sons from Administrative Law, 61 Stan L Rev 869, 876–84 (2009) (outlining the dangers 
of vesting adjudicative powers in prosecutors who investigate and build cases). See also 
Tracey L. Meares, What’s Wrong with Gideon, 70 U Chi L Rev 215, 219 (2003) (discuss-
ing the importance of an independent adjudicator to the public’s perception that criminal 
justice proceedings are fair). 
 37 See, for example, Cal Const Art VI, § 21 (authorizing members of the bar to serve 
as temporary judges and exercise judicial powers in certain cases with the parties’  
consent).  
 38 See Francis E. McGovern, Appointing Special Masters and Other Judicial Ad-
juncts: A Handbook for Judges *1917 (paper submitted at ALI-ABA Course of Study, 
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the court might conduct a prearbitration colloquy, advising the 
defendant of the trial-related rights he would lose; the defendant 
would waive those rights in open court, as in a plea colloquy.39 
The parties would also execute a written agreement—analogous 
to a plea agreement—in which they would agree to be bound by 
the arbitrator’s decision.40 They would then arbitrate and report 
the results back to the court, which would enter judgment ac-
cordingly. The court would not second-guess the arbitrator’s 
work save, perhaps, in cases of alleged manifest injustice.41 
III.  CONSEQUENCES 
Of course, we would not wish to encourage unbundled bar-
gains unless we believe that doing so will make our adjudicatory 
apparatus better rather than worse. Here I sketch out why this 
conclusion is plausible, and thus why unbundled bargaining is 
worthy of study alongside other potential reforms. I start by 
considering the effects of unbundled bargaining on the litigants 
before turning to third-party and social effects. 
If indeed it is normatively desirable to expand the practice, I 
should add, the Constitution may well allow it: The Supreme 
Court presumes that even the most vaunted criminal procedure 
rights are waivable.42 And it seems not to “recognize the waiver 
of criminal protections through plea bargains to entail a form of 
the unconstitutional conditions problem.”43 Many other potential 
 
Civil Practice and Litigation Techniques in Federal and State Courts, July 2007) (avail-
able on Westlaw at SN009 ALI-ABA 1911) (“All courts have the power to appoint a spe-
cial master or other type of judicial adjunct to assist with . . . criminal cases.”). 
 39 See, for example, FRCrP 11(b). 
 40 See, for example, FRCrP 11(c). There is at least a colorable argument that such 
an agreement would be valid under precedents enforcing bargains made in plea agree-
ments. See, for example, Santobello v New York, 404 US 257, 262 (1971) (enforcing a 
prosecutor’s promise regarding sentencing); United States v Hahn, 359 F3d 1315, 1329 
(10th Cir 2004) (en banc) (enforcing a defendant’s agreement to waive his right to an  
appeal). 
 41 See, for example, Matthews v National Football League Management Council, 
688 F3d 1107, 1115 (9th Cir 2012) (discussing a similar exception in the civil context).  
 42 See United States v Mezzanato, 513 US 196, 200–03 (1995); Peretz v United 
States, 501 US 923, 936–37 (1990). 
 43 Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 Nw U L Rev 801, 801 (2003). See also id 
at 832–33. The unconstitutional-conditions doctrine limits the circumstances in which 
the government may condition the provision of a benefit on the recipient’s waiver of con-
stitutional rights, which plea bargaining does. See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Pow-
ers and the Criminal Law, 58 Stan L Rev 989, 1045–46 (2006) (calling the Court’s treat-
ment of plea bargaining “a departure from its unconstitutional conditions 
jurisprudence”). Alternatively, to reconcile plea bargaining with the unconstitutional-
conditions doctrine, one can read the plea bargaining decisions as holding that there is 
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constitutional objections overlap substantially with normative 
ones. With this in mind, and without fully closing the door on 
the constitutional question, I focus here on normative concerns.44 
A. Private Effects 
In predicting the likely effects of increased unbundled bar-
gaining, the initial intuition is simply that more choice makes 
the parties better off.45 Examining the position of defendants 
and prosecutors separately helps confirm this intuition. Begin-
ning with defendants: The majority of those accused plead 
guilty.46 Some within this group might prefer to contest guilt but 
are not willing to pay the high price, in terms of potential pun-
ishment, for a full-blown jury trial. But these defendants might 
elect to purchase a cheaper, streamlined procedure were one 
available. Other defendants do opt for jury trials. These defend-
ants may be paying for many rights they do not want—rights 
the exercise of which is unlikely to improve the fairness or accu-
racy of adjudication in their case. The principal value of these 
rights (to defendants like this) is to impose trial costs on the 
prosecution. Rather than make the prosecution suffer, a defend-
ant might want to reduce his sentencing exposure by selling 
these rights to the government. 
Prosecutors should benefit, too. The literature rightly focus-
es on defendants who plead guilty only reluctantly. But  
 
“no ‘substantive’ constitutional right to trial in the presence of adequate alternative pro-
cedures for the determination of guilt,” of which plea bargaining is one example. Thomas 
R. McCoy and Michael J. Mirra, Plea Bargaining as Due Process in Determining Guilt, 
32 Stan L Rev 887, 941 (1980). This view only strengthens the argument that unbundled 
bargaining is constitutional, as the streamlined adjudicatory procedures that unbundled 
bargaining contemplates provide more process than plea bargaining does—if plea bar-
gaining is an adequate alternative to a full-blown jury trial, so is streamlined  
adversarial testing. 
 44 When I say that unbundled bargaining may be constitutional, I mean that it 
seems to comport with the principles supporting the prior case law on waiver and plea 
bargaining. So if Ronald Dworkin’s omniscient Hercules were the judge, he may well 
permit it. See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 239 (Belknap 1986). I do not think that 
every trial judge would actually allow these bargains today. For example, as mentioned 
above, many federal courts forbid defendants to agree to a nonunanimous jury verdict. 
See note 14. 
 45 See Easterbrook, 101 Yale L J at 1975 (cited in note 16). This is not always true, 
however. See generally Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 1 J Legal Analysis 737 (cited in note 
19) (showing that, due to collective-action problems, defendants may be worse off if plea 
bargains are permitted than if trials are mandatory). 
 46 See Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics at table 5.57.2006 (Bureau of Jus-
tice Statistics, 2006), archived at http://perma.cc/58G6-TYYV. 
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prosecutors may also have misgivings—namely, about deals 
they view as too lenient. Prosecutors may view these bargains as 
merely the lesser of two evils, preferable only to full-blown jury 
trials, with their high costs and risk of acquittal. If we think of 
guilty pleas as prosecutorial insurance against the costs and 
risks of trial,47 the all-or-nothing framework forces prosecutors 
to insure fully or not at all. They usually insure. But they may 
often prefer to buy partial coverage.48 The limited available  
empirical evidence supports this hypothesis. Prosecutors make 
deals for bench trials and appeal waivers, for example.49 
A skeptic might object that “market failures” render these 
benefits illusory: bargaining takes place within a coercive 
framework in which the parties have asymmetric information 
and act through imperfect agents, the argument goes. This is a 
serious objection, but it is not unique to unbundled bargains. 
Plea bargaining occurs in the same environment.50 The market-
failure objection, therefore, does not help us choose between a 
plea bargaining world and one of unbundled bargaining unless it 
takes on greater force in the latter system. It is possible that 
this is so, but it is not so obvious as to justify jettisoning the idea 
altogether. Indeed, unbundled bargains may well be less coercive 
than plea bargains because the sentencing differentials are 
smaller.51 
B. Third-Party and Social Effects 
Even if unbundled bargains benefit the parties, one might 
wish to restrict them if they generate significant negative  
 
 47 See Gene M. Grossman and Michael L. Katz, Plea Bargaining and Social Wel-
fare, 73 Am Econ Rev 749, 749 (1983). 
 48 See Fisher, 97 J Crim L & Crimin at 950 (cited in note 3) (distinguishing be-
tween “partial” and “full” prosecutorial insurance against the risk of acquittal based on 
the degree of “sanction reduction” the prosecutor must “pay”). 
 49 See King, 47 UCLA L Rev at 119 (cited in note 6); Schulhofer, 97 Harv L Rev at 
1062–63 (cited in note 9). 
 50 See John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U Chi L Rev 3, 12–13 
(1978) (criticizing plea bargains as coercive); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice 
Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J Legal Stud 43, 47–60 (1988) (identifying “market 
failure[s]” in plea bargaining); Scott and Stuntz, 101 Yale L J at 1940–49 (cited in note 
16) (showing how asymmetric information “breaks down” the “assumption of efficient 
contracting”).  
 51 See Langbein, 46 U Chi L Rev at 12 (cited in note 50) (asserting that the “sen-
tencing differential is what makes plea bargaining coercive”). 
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externalities.52 Some criminal procedure rights, for example, are 
said to benefit individuals other than the defendant. Trading in 
these rights threatens harm to those third-party beneficiaries, 
potentially justifying restraints on alienation. This objection—
however plausible on its face—confronts several difficulties. As 
an initial matter, the trajectory of Supreme Court doctrine 
points sharply away from the collectivist conception of rights the 
objection entails.53 Criminal procedure rights, the Court has 
clarified over time, generally exist to benefit the defendant and 
thus are waivable—a conclusion that follows from the defend-
ant’s right to control his defense.54 So the universe of rights to 
which this objection could apply is increasingly small. 
Still, there do remain rights we regard as inflected with col-
lectivist values. For example, the Constitution forbids the prose-
cution, during jury selection, to exercise peremptory challenges 
to remove prospective jurors on the basis of race.55 This prohibi-
tion (and its correlative right) protects not only the criminal de-
fendant but also the excluded jurors and the community at 
large.56 We might, therefore, think that the right is not really 
the defendant’s to trade away. Yet we let defendants forfeit the 
right through inaction or tardiness, with no recompense.57 We do 
 
 52 See Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089, 1111–12 (1972) (dis-
cussing externalities and “moralisms” as grounds for inalienability); Seth F. Kreimer, 
Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U Pa L 
Rev 1293, 1378–93 (1984) (arguing that effects of alienation on “other members of  
society” may be a ground for inalienability of rights).  
 53 See King, 47 UCLA L Rev at 120–30 (cited in note 3) (tracing the doctrinal histo-
ry of the view that criminal procedure rights are principally aimed at shielding the in-
terests of individual citizens rather than the public at large).  
 54 See generally Erica J. Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal De-
fendant’s Right to Control the Case, 90 BU L Rev 1147 (2010). See also Kathleen M.  
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv L Rev 1413, 1487–88 (1989) (arguing 
that an exclusive focus on the collective or social values that rights serve ignores “persis-
tent constitutional conceptions of freedom as autonomous moral agency and of justice as 
respect for individuals’ choices for their own lives”). 
 55 See Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79, 89 (1986). 
 56 See Powers v Ohio, 499 US 400, 406, 415 (1991). For an argument that, notwith-
standing the doctrinal evolution discussed above, many criminal procedure rights “aim 
to protect persons other than those who assert them,” see William J. Stuntz, Waiving 
Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 Va L Rev 761, 765–66 (1989). 
 57 See, for example, Clark v Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co, 937 F2d 
934, 939–40 (4th Cir 1991) (“[I]t is [not] the duty of the court to act sua sponte to prevent 
discriminatory exclusion of jurors. Rather, even in criminal cases, the objection is 
deemed waived if not timely raised.”). 
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not force them to invoke it, nor do we require trial courts to po-
lice for discriminatory challenges sua sponte.58 
That said, we might fear that unrestricted alienability of the 
right will reduce the rate of rights enforcement by defendants; or 
that, if the prosecutor knows before jury selection that the usual 
rules do not apply, the odds of discrimination tick sharply up-
ward. I cannot assuage these fears entirely. But neither are they 
overwhelming. After all, other stakeholders have an interest in 
monitoring prosecutorial behavior, including the jurors them-
selves and interest groups that represent them.59 Once it is clear 
that restrictions on alienability impose costs on defendants—by 
reducing the value they can extract from their rights—the task 
becomes one of balancing the interests of defendants and third 
parties by calibrating the extent of reliance on each group for 
rights enforcement. 
Other externalities might harm society more generally. 
Trading rights for sentencing concessions, it might be said, 
cheapens those rights and diminishes their place in our consti-
tutional order. And it privileges private agreement over the pub-
lic search for truth. Here, however, as before, the selfsame objec-
tions apply to plea bargaining. Plea bargains, too, commodify 
rights and reflect “an essentially agnostic and private view of 
criminal justice as an outcome of personal deals rather than of 
 
 58 See id. 
 59 For discussion of suits by individual jurors, see Powers, 499 US at 414 
(“[I]ndividual jurors subjected to racial exclusion have the legal right to bring suit on 
their own behalf.”). But see id at 414–15 (observing that “[t]he barriers to a suit by an 
excluded juror are daunting”). For discussion of the role that interest groups might play, 
see Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: A Continuing Legacy *47 (Equal Jus-
tice Initiative, Aug 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/9XQD-VLUS (urging community 
groups, civil and human rights organizations, and concerned citizens to attend court pro-
ceedings to monitor jury selection and to demand data from prosecutors on the use of 
peremptory strikes). The issue also falls within the DOJ’s ambit. See 18 USC § 243 
(criminalizing racial discrimination in jury selection). See also Richard A. Epstein, Why 
Restrain Alienation?, 85 Colum L Rev 970, 970 (1985) (“The proper office for restraints 
on alienation is to provide indirect control over external harms when direct means of con-
trol are ineffective to the task.”) (emphasis added); King, 47 UCLA L Rev at 142 (cited in 
note 3) (noting the advantages of an approach to waiver doctrine “that conditions relief 
for defendants who trade away entitlements upon the absence of alternative means of 
protecting third-party interests injured by the trade”). In other contexts, some rights 
may be forfeited through inaction but not alienated (that is, transferred), such as the 
right to vote. The distinction makes less sense here. See Scott and Stuntz, 101 Yale L J 
at 1916 (cited in note 16) (noting that, in plea bargaining, the parties internalize most of 
the costs and benefits of the bargain, whereas in vote trading, “the social costs of the 
transaction are borne by the rest of the electorate”). 
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collective searches for the truth.”60 And even granting some dan-
ger in commodifying rights, exalting them without regard for 
consequences is treacherous too.61 
Social harms may, however, justify restraints on the aliena-
tion of one category of rights (and there may be others): rights 
that safeguard the judicial decisionmaking process. I do not 
think that the defendant, for instance, could agree to be tried in 
court by a jury of orangutans.62 If nothing else, judicial deci-
sionmaking requires the application of general legal principles 
to the facts of individual cases. To hollow out that core is to 
threaten the judiciary’s legitimacy in both a legal and sociologi-
cal sense.63 Applying this principle, judicial impartiality might 
be thought necessary to “ensure the sort of detachment essential 
to principled reasoning.”64 And public trials may be the only reli-
able way to monitor the adjudicative process to ensure its  
fundamental validity. Deals that sacrifice these rights would be 
highly suspicious. Despite its somewhat fuzzy edges, this carve-
out, assuming it need be made, need not swallow the rule. The 
crucial question would be whether the decisionmaker is applying 
law to facts. A judge can do that as well as a jury; a small jury 
as well as a larger one; and the burden of proof and evidentiary 
rules do not dictate its feasibility. 
  
 
 60 Inga Markovits, Book Review, Playing the Opposites Game: On Mirjan 
Damaška’s The Faces of Justice and State Authority, 41 Stan L Rev 1313, 1321 (1989). 
 61 See Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 Yale 
L J 2176, 2191 (2013) (arguing that “protecting defendants’ rights is quite different from 
protecting defendants” and may even legitimate the status quo). 
 62 See United States v Josefik, 753 F2d 585, 588 (7th Cir 1985) (“[I]f the parties 
stipulated to trial by 12 orangutans the defendant’s conviction would be invalid notwith-
standing his consent, because some minimum of civilized procedure is required by com-
munity feeling regardless of what the defendant wants or is willing to accept.”). 
 63 See Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules through Party 
Choice, 90 Tex L Rev 1329, 1387–88 (2012) (“If parties choose procedural rules that un-
dermine the capacity of judges . . . to engage in principled reasoning [that applies gen-
eral legal principles to particular facts of a case,] then perhaps their choices should not 
be honored.”); Fisher, 97 J Crim L & Crimin at 985–87, 991–93 (cited in note 3);  
Mezzanatto, 513 US at 204 (“There may be some evidentiary provisions that are so fun-
damental to the reliability of the factfinding process that they may never be waived 
without irreparably ‘discredit[ing] the federal courts.’”). See also Richard H. Fallon Jr, 
Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 Harv L Rev 1787, 1794–1801 (2005) (disentangling 
legal, sociological, and moral senses of constitutional legitimacy). 
 64 Bone, 90 Tex L Rev at 1387 (cited in note 63). 
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Further objections are certainly possible, especially once we 
consider potential second- and third-order effects.65 My aim is 
not to defeat, or even identify, every potential one. For even if 
valid objections persist, they make up only one side of the equa-
tion. Indeed, perhaps the most important point I wish to make is 
this: prohibiting or discouraging unbundled bargaining imposes 
social costs of its own. A binary plea bargaining system pre-
scribes a one-size-fits-all jury trial for every defendant who 
wishes to contest his guilt, no matter how awkwardly the proce-
dures fit the case. This is not to fault those who designed the 
process. No single rulemaker—court or legislature (or Framer)—
could possibly foresee, and account for in procedural rules, the 
myriad eventualities that might arise in the course of criminal 
litigation. Unbundled bargaining moves us toward a system in 
which trial procedures are tailored to meet the parties’ prefer-
ences and the needs of the case, promoting both defendant au-
tonomy and efficient deployment of judicial and attorney re-
sources.66 Put differently, streamlining some full-blown jury 
trials will conserve scarce resources, which can then be spent on 
additional trials for defendants who presently plead guilty. It is 
perhaps unsurprising, then, that analogies to unbundled bar-
gaining exist in foreign systems67 as well as domestic civil  
litigation.68 
 
 65 See Gross, 56 NY L Sch L Rev at 1029 (cited in note 3) (predicting that “the most 
important impact” of a proposed system in which defendants trade trial rights for  
procedural advantages on post-conviction review “might be its second- and third-level 
effects, which are impossible to predict”). One concern, for example, might be the way in 
which expanded unbundled bargaining, by changing the makeup of the body of cases 
that are litigated rather than settled, would influence the content of criminal procedure 
rules. See George L. Priest, Selective Characteristics of Litigation, 9 J Legal Stud 399, 
421 (1980) (arguing that “the determinants of the parties’ litigation decisions are the in-
struments that will provide the most direct prediction of the content of litigated  
decisions”).  
 66 See Note, Comparative Domestic Constitutionalism: Rethinking Criminal Proce-
dure Using the Administrative Constitution, 119 Harv L Rev 2530, 2533–41 (2006) (dis-
cussing the benefits of substance-specific procedural law and the costs of its transsub-
stantive counterpart). See also Frase, 78 Cal L Rev at 641–44 (cited in note 4) (urging 
the adoption of “issue-narrowing procedures” that would permit courts to “concentrate on 
the issues that are genuinely in dispute . . . thereby encouraging the parties to litigate 
key issues that should not be plea bargained away”). 
 67 In France, for example, the defendant can agree to have his offense “correctional-
ized”—that is, downgraded. This reduces his sentencing exposure, but the case is then 
heard in a lower court with fewer procedural protections, in which the odds of conviction 
are slightly higher. “The defendant receives a charge reduction in return for his or her 
‘cooperation’ in not insisting on the greater procedural protections associated with felony 
charges.” Frase, 78 Cal L Rev at 631 (cited in note 4). See also id at 622–23, 630–34; 
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At the other end of the spectrum, by offering cheaper, 
streamlined adjudication, unbundled bargaining should make 
genuine adversarial testing more common. This would have sev-
eral benefits. First, plea bargaining appears to do a poor job dis-
tinguishing guilty from innocent defendants. Among other 
things, the dynamics of party interactions in plea bargaining 
make it hard for innocent defendants to identify themselves.69 
Even streamlined trials would likely be more accurate, which 
would reduce the social costs of wrongful convictions and en-
hance the criminal law’s deterrent effects.70 Second, plea bar-
gaining involves serious agency costs—harms that stem from a 
divergence between the incentives of defense lawyers and de-
fendants, and prosecutors and the public, respectively. Adjudica-
tion makes defense attorney and prosecutor performance more 
visible—and thus more accountable—thereby reducing these 
agency costs.71 Likewise, trials, like audits, shine a light on  
investigatory behavior and the exercise of governmental power 
more generally.72 Third, to the extent these additional  
 
Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative 
View, 54 Am J Comp L 199, 226 (2006) (reporting that German “judges would grant the 
defendant sentencing concessions in exchange for the defense ceasing [burdensome] evi-
dence-gathering motions”). 
 68 See Bone, 90 Tex L Rev at 1342–52 (cited in note 63). Civil arbitration permits 
adjudication by virtually any arbiter under contractually designated procedures. 
 69 See Scott and Stuntz, 101 Yale L J at 1946–49 (cited in note 16). See also gener-
ally Lucian E. Dervan and Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendant’s Dilemma: An 
Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 103 J Crim L & 
Crimin 1 (2013) (reviewing the literature and conducting a new experiment, finding that 
a majority of innocent student-participants admitted to cheating in order to avoid aca-
demic consequences). 
 70 See Gross, 56 NY L Sch L Rev at 1016 (cited in note 3) (asserting that “the accu-
racy of the system would improve if we . . . conducted contested public trials before neu-
tral tribunals in at least a substantial proportion of criminal prosecutions,” even if these 
trials were not full-blown jury trials); Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudica-
tion: An Economic Analysis, 23 J Legal Stud 307, 348 (1994) (explaining that accuracy 
improves deterrence by increasing the chances that guilty persons are punished and by 
decreasing the chances that innocent persons are punished, which makes “harmful acts 
less attractive and harmless behavior more attractive”); McCoy and Mirra, 32 Stan L 
Rev at 921–22 (cited in note 43). 
 71 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 Yale L J 1979, 
1987–91, 2002–03 (1992). See also William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal 
Justice 302 (Belknap 2011). 
 72 See Schulhofer, 97 Harv L Rev at 1105–06 (cited in note 9) (explaining that ad-
versarial testing helps to protect individual and community freedoms from abuses of 
government power); Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the 
Prosecution, 32 Fordham Urban L J 315, 324–32 (2005) (detailing how, in contrast to tri-
als, “guilty pleas [ ] serve to insulate police practice from scrutiny”). On trials as audits, 
see generally Daniel Richman, Framing the Prosecution, 87 S Cal L Rev 673 (2014). 
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adjudications are jury trials (of any sort), they should promote 
democratic values like local control and help to cultivate an ac-
tive and informed citizenry.73 And finally, having more adjudica-
tions strengthens the bargaining position of defendants, whose 
threats of going to trial become more credible, nudging plea bar-
gaining closer to the law’s shadow.74 
CONCLUSION 
Many scholars believe that the complexity of the American 
trial process drives the high rate of guilty pleas.75 This view mo-
tivates calls for the repeal of procedural protections the Court 
has adopted, in order to streamline trials.76 It seems unlikely 
that the Court will strip away criminal procedure protections 
wholesale in an effort to reduce plea bargaining, even if it 
thought the Constitution gave it the latitude to do so.77 Nor do I 
wish for this to happen. After all, each procedural protection is 
very likely valuable to defendants in some cases. The right 
against discriminatory peremptory strikes may be crucial in a 
racially charged prosecution, for instance, or Confrontation 
Clause rights when the government’s theory turns entirely on 
laboratory analysis. We want these rights to be available for de-
fendants who wish or need to invoke them. But we should seri-
ously consider whether, in other cases, we’d be better off to let 
defendants bargain them away, one at a time, instead. 
 
 73 See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 318 (Library of America 2004) 
(“[T]he jury, which is the most energetic form of popular rule, is also the most effective 
means of teaching the people how to rule.”); Stuntz, Collapse at 287, 303 (cited in note 
71) (implying that a higher rate of jury trials better serves democracy). 
 74 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 Harv L 
Rev 2464, 2478–79 (2004) (asserting that prosecutors give more-generous sentencing 
concessions when they face credible threats of going to trial); Lynch, 66 Fordham L Rev 
at 2146–47 (cited in note 2) (arguing that a critical mass of jury trials is necessary for 
“checking prosecutorial overreaching and setting the parameters of the bargaining  
system”). 
 75 See, for example, Alschuler, 50 U Chi L Rev at 969–70, 988 (cited in note 1); 
John H. Langbein, Land without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 Mich L 
Rev 204, 205–06 (1979). 
 76 See, for example, Alschuler, 50 U Chi L Rev at 995–1011, 1016–22 (cited in note 
1) (suggesting mixed tribunals of lay and professional judges in most cases, simplified 
jury-selection procedures and evidentiary rules, judicial control over ordering of proof 
and initial witness examinations, relaxed self-incrimination protections, and smaller  
juries). 
 77 See id at 1010 (conceding that simply streamlining trial procedures is a “pipe 
dream” given state constitutional requirements). 
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